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Abstract
In this paper we consider a multivariate model–based approach to measure the
dynamic evolution of tail risk interdependence among US banks, financial services
and insurance sectors. To deeply investigate the risk contribution of insurers we
consider separately life and non–life companies. To achieve this goal we apply the
multivariate student–t Markov Switching model and the Multiple–CoVaR (CoES)
risk measures introduced in Bernardi et al. (2013b) to account for both the known
stylised characteristics of the data and the contemporaneous joint distress events
affecting financial sectors. Our empirical investigation finds that banks appear to
be the major source of risk for all the remaining sectors, followed by the financial
services and the insurance sectors, showing that insurance sector significantly
contributes as well to the overall risk. Moreover, we find that the role of each sector
in contributing to other sectors distress evolves over time accordingly to the current
predominant financial condition, implying different interconnection strength.
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1 Introduction
For long time there has been a distinct separation among insurance, banking and other
financial institutions in most countries, so that events in one sector usually had little
effect on the others. However, during the recent years the barriers among institutions
have been partly dismantled, resulting in much closer interconnections and overlaps
between them and their activities. Direct and indirect dependencies among participants
of a financial market contribute to the spread of malfunctions from one failing financial
institution to the remaining market participants. Moreover, the latest financial crises
have created a deep interest in measuring tail risk interdependence among institutions
in order to evaluate the spillover effect on the real economy. The importance of the
interconnectedness among institutions has been recognised to be a key requirement
for the spread of a systemic crisis. In literature there exist a a variety of recent
works and discussions concerning this topic (see e.g. Billio et al., 2012; Brechmann
et al., 2013; Cont and Moussa, 2010; Cont et al., 2012; Markose et al. 2012; Podlich
and Wedow, 2013). In line with those considerations, the aim of this paper is to
investigate and fill the gap of inter–sectors analysis and to address the problem of
assessing systemic importance among different sectors composing the financial system
in order to examine the systemically importance financial sectors. Recently, one of the
most considered co–risk measure has been the Conditional Value–at–Risk (CoVaR) of
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) which measure the Value–at–Risk of an institution
conditional on another institution being in financial distress. The recent literature on
CoVaR measure has been grown during the last few years (see Girardi and Ergu¨n, 2013;
Bernardi et al., 2013a; Bernardi et al., 2013b; Castro and Ferrari, 2014; Bernal et al.,
2013; Cao, 2013; and Jaeger–Ambrozewicz, 2012). However, when dealing with highly
interconnected systems, it is possible that several institutions joint experience financial
distress events at the same time; this situation can not be captured by the traditional
CoVaR measure which consider an institution’s distress per time. Underestimation of
the simultaneous occurrence of interconnected rare events and the consequent bias in
evaluating the transmission of risks among sectors may cause misleading policy reaction.
To account for possible underestimation problems, recently Bernardi et al. (2013b) and
Cao (2013) proposed an extension of the traditional CoVaR and Conditional Expected
Shortfall (CoES), the so called Multiple–CoVaR and Mutiple–CoES, which consider
joint occurrence of extreme losses. Here, following Bernardi et al. (2013b) we propose
a multivariate model–based approach to measure tail risk interdependence dynamics
when different sectors may experience extreme tail risk events at the same time. The
approach is based on a multivariate Student–t Markov Switching model being able
to capture different dynamic risk profiles through the presence of latent states, as
well as to account for several stylised facts, like asymmetry, heavy tails, non linearity
and persistence of extreme observations, which are crucial in financial returns time
series analysis (see e.g. 2011). In this way we contribute to evaluate risk measures
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that are intrinsically dynamics since they rely on time–varying loadings of individual
risk factors represented by the Value–at–Risks. The resulting dynamic evolution over
time provides important monitoring tools for the market–based macro–prudential or
financial stability regulation. Moreover, since we evaluate those measures on the
Markov Switching predictive distribution we provide a forward–looking approach to
tail risk interdependence assessment.
Our analysis is mainly focused on modelling and measuring major financial sectors
interconnectedness; the idea is to stress the importance of mapping out the relationships
between all those sectors highlighting the degree of their connectivities. We achieve
this goal by monitoring each sectors’ total risk evolution, which may provide an early
warning indicator of the global financial crisis. Moreover, measuring the contribution
of each sector to the riskiness of the remaining ones, using the cross comparison of the
proposed multiple risk measures, we are able to detect the amount of interconnection
among sectors. Although most of the recent literature focuses on the banking
environment, the breakdown of companies other than banks, have had a wide impact
on the real economy. Sectors like insurance, who have been considered for long time
safer than banks in their activities, showed a significantly altered risk profile which
may affect the overall risk amount of the system (see Billio et al., 2012, Brechmann
et al., 2013 and Harrington, 2009). To deeply investigate the risk contribution of the
insurance sector we investigate both life and non–life companies. In particular to show
the effective interdependence among financial sectors we analyse the Dow Jones US
banks, the Dow Jones US financial services, the Dow Jones life and non–life insurance
indexes, for the period from January 1, 1992 to June 28, 2013. To asses the relative
institutions’ risk contributions we calculate the Multiple–∆CoVaR and the Multiple–
∆CoES which are the multiple generalization of the ∆CoVaR and the ∆CoES of Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011) in line with Bernardi et al. (2013b). The Shapley (1953)
value methodology is then applied to finally attribute the overall risk shares to each
institution. From an empirical point of view this is the first attempt to segment the
insurance sector between life and non–life companies in a risk contribution framework.
This latter aspect is quite interesting because life and non–life insurers differ by the
composition of their investment portfolio which is of great importance for systemic risk
management.
Our empirical findings suggest that each financial sector significantly impacts on
each other during crisis periods, as well as during more stable phases. When comparing
the contribution of each financial industry, banks appear to be the major source of risk
for all the remaining sectors, followed by financial services and the insurance industry
showing that insurance sector contribute as well to the overall risk. Moreover, we
find that the role of each sector in contributing to other sectors distress evolves over
time accordingly to the current predominant financial condition. We also show that
banks and financial services are more interconnected than the insurance sectors and
that the interconnection strengthen between banks and insurance is more evident after
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the 2008 global financial crisis increasing the probability of occurring joint distress
events. Finally, comparing life and non–life insurance we find that they are highly
interconnected both during crisis periods, as well as during financial stability phases,
showing a lower interconnection after the end of the 2008 crisis.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the
Student–t Markov Switching model. Section 3 provides the definition of the risk
measures used throughout the paper. Section 4 describes our empirical results while
Section 5 discusses our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we provide a brief description of the Markov Switching (MS) models
with particular emphasis to the Student–t component distribution. The choice of this
model is motivated by its attitude to well represent the financial time series dynamics
capturing the underlying structure of the observations like heavy tails, asymmetry and
non linear dependence. Moreover, the hidden Markov structure is able to identify
periods of crisis as well as phases of financial stability. Those characteristics are
particularly relevant when the main objective is to measure and manage financial or
systemic risks. In particular, the MS model dynamics allows us to quantify the evolution
over time and over states of the overall risk institutions’ contributions. For a deeper
review of MS models, see e.g. Cappe´ et al. (2005), Zucchini and MacDonald (2009) and
Dymarski (2011). Recent applications of MS models to financial market returns may
be found in Bulla (2011), Amisano and Geweke (2011), Geweke and Amisano (2010).
Recently Bernardi et al. (2013b) analysed the implications of multivariate Student–t
MS models to evaluate extreme tail risk interconnectedness among financial markets
participants in the bank sector. In what follows we shortly describe the model they
propose to which we refer throughout the paper.
Let {Yt, t = 1, . . . , T} denote a sequence of multivariate observations, where Yt =
{y1,t, y2,t, . . . , yp,t} ∈ R
p, and {St, t = 1, . . . , T} a Markov chain defined on the state
space {1, 2, . . . , L}. In the MS model setting the conditional distribution for the
observation process {Yt} depends solely on the latent state at time t, i.e.
f (Yt = Yt | Y1 = y1, . . . ,Yt−1 = yt−1,S1 = ß1, . . . ,St = ßt) = f (Yt = yt | St = ßt) ,
and the unobservable process {St} satisfies the following Markov property
P (St = ßt | S1 = ß1,S2 = ß2, . . . ,St−1 = ßt−1) = P (St = ßt | St−1 = ßt−1) .
When dealing with financial time series it is important to account for the well known
stylised facts as well as possible dependence structures among extreme events which
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are relevant in assessing economic risks. Those reasons motivate our assumption of
multivariate Student–t distribution for modelling the observed process, i.e.
Yt | St = ßt ∼ Tp
(
µßt ,Σßt , νßt
)
(2.1)
where (µl,Σl, νl), l = 1, 2, . . . , L denote location, scale and degrees of freedom
parameters respectively.
To make inference on the unknown model parameters we consider the Expectation–
Maximization (EM) approach, see Dempster et al. (1977) for details while Bernardi et
al. (2013b) for the algorithm under the multivariate Student–t assumption.
The multiple risk measures considered in the paper to asses risk interdependence
are calculated on the predictive distribution of the observables in order to get a
forward looking risk quantification. Let h > 0 denotes the forecasting horizon, the
predictive distribution of MS models is a finite mixture of component specific predictive
distributions
p (yt+h | It) =
L∑
l=1
pi
(h)
l f (yt+h | St+h = l) (2.2)
with mixing weights
pi
(h)
l
=
L∑
j=1
Qhj,lP (St = j | It) , (2.3)
where It is the information up to time t, Q
h
l,j is the (j, l)-th entry of the Markovian
transition matrix Q = {qj,l} to the power h with qj,l = P (St = j | St−1 = l). In what
follow we consider h = 1.
3 Multiple risk measures
The main objective of the paper is to evaluate the interdependence among risky
events in a multivariate setting in order to capture the simultaneous interconnectedness
between insurance, banks and other financial service companies. To measure the co–
movement between those institutions we refer to the Multiple–CoVaR and Multiple–
CoES introduced in Bernardi et al. (2013b) who generalized the Adrian and
Brunnermeier’s CoVaR and CoES to account for multiple contemporaneous distress
events. In this way we are able to measure the contribution of one financial sector to
the riskiness of a different sector being contemporaneously linked to all the remaining
ones that may themselves experience extreme losses. Moreover, as already mentioned,
evaluating risk measures on MS models allows to capture the risk evolution driven by
different financial and economics conditions. In what follows we define the multiple
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risk measures.
Let S = {1, 2, . . . , p} be a set of p institutions, we assume that the conditioning event
is a set of d institutions under distress indexed by Jd = {j1, j2, . . . , jd} ⊂ dCp−1, where
dCp−1 is the set of all possible combinations of p−1 elements of class d, with d ≤ p−1.
Moreover, assuming that institution i ∈ S with i /∈ Jd and Jn = Jd is the set of
institutions being in the “normal” state, we define the “Multiple–CoVaR”, CoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
as follows.
Definition 3.1. Let Y = (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yi, . . . ,Yp) be the vector of institution returns,
then CoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
is the Value–at–Risk of institution i ∈ S, conditional on the set
of institutions Jd being at their individual VaRτ2–level yˆ
τ2
Jd
=
(
yˆτ2j1 , yˆ
τ2
j2
, . . . , yˆτ2jd
)
and the set of institutions Jn = Jd being at their individual VaR0.5–level yˆ
0.5
Jn
=(
yˆ0.5jd+1, yˆ
0.5
jd+2
, . . . , yˆ0.5jp−1
)
i.e., CoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
satisfies the following equation
P
(
Yi ≤ CoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
| YJd = yˆ
τ2
Jd
,YJn = yˆ
0.5
Jn
)
= τ1, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , p. (3.1)
The lack of subadditivity property of the Value–a–Risk suggests to introduce, in
addition to the CoVaR, the Conditional Expected Shortfall (CoES), defined by Adrian
and Brunnermeier (2011) as the Expected Shortfall (ES) evaluated on the conditional
distribution of Yi given Yj, for two different institutions i and j. The following definition
characterises the extension of CoES to the Multiple–CoES accounting for multiple
contemporaneous distress events.
Definition 3.2. Let Y = (Y1,Y2, . . . ,Yp) be the vector of institution returns, then
the CoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
is the Expected Shortfall of institution i ∈ S, conditional on the set
of institutions Jd being
at their individual ESτ2-level ψ̂yJd
(
yˆτ2Jd
)
=
(
ψˆyj1
(
yˆτ2j1
)
, ψˆyj2
(
yˆτ2j2
)
, . . . , ψˆyjd
(
yˆτ2jd
))
and the set of institutions Jn being at their individual ES0.5–level ψ̂yJn
(
yˆτ2Jn
)
=(
ψˆyjd+1
(
yˆτ2jd+1
)
, ψˆyjd+2
(
yˆτ2jd+2
)
, . . . , ψˆyjp−1
(
yˆτ2jp−1
))
, with ψˆyj
(
yˆτj
)
≡ ESτ (Yj), ∀j =
1, 2, . . . , d, and can be defined in the following way
CoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
≡ E
(
Yi | Yi ≤ yˆ
τ1
i ,YJd = ψ̂yJd
(
yˆ
τ2
Jd
)
,YJn = ψ̂yJn
(
yˆ0.5Jn
))
. (3.2)
Analytical formulae for the Multiple–CoVaR and Multiple–CoES defined in equation
(3.1) and (3.2) respectively, under the Multivariate Gaussian and Student–t assumption
are provided in Bernardi et al. (2013b).
In order to quantify the marginal contribution of individual institutions, we
consider the Multiple–∆CoVaR (∆MCoVaR) and the Multiple–∆CoES (∆MCoES) as
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straightforward generalization of the ∆CoVaR and ∆CoES of Adrian and Brunnermaier
defined as follows:
∆MCoVaR
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
= CoVaRτ1
(
Yi | YJd = yˆ
τ2
Jd
,YJn = yˆ
0.5
Jn
)
−
CoVaRτ1
(
Yi | YJd∪Jn = yˆ
0.5
Jd∪Jn
)
(3.3)
∆MCoES
τ1|τ2
i|Jd
= ESτ1
(
Yi | YJd = yˆ
τ2
Jd
,YJn = yˆ
50%
Jn
)
−
ESτ1
(
Yi | YJd∪Jn = yˆ
50%
Jd∪Jn
)
. (3.4)
Since different sets of institutions belonging to the conditioning distress events qualify
different measures of risk contribution, to compose the puzzle of overall risk attribution
to each institution we apply the Shapley value methodology initially proposed by
Shapley (1953) in the field of cooperative games. The idea of applying the Shapley
value methodology to the systemic risk attribution has been previously considered by
Tarashev et al. (2010), Cao (2013) and Bernardi et al. (2013b). The portion of
the overall value that the Shapley methodology attributes to each of the players in
a cooperative game equals the average of this player’s marginal contribution to the
value created by all possible permutations on the set of players as evaluated by the
∆MCoVaR and ∆MCoES risk measures. In our setting this value coincides with the
overall risk generated by the market participants. The additivity axiom satisfied by
the Shapley value methodology ensures that the risk allocation is efficient in the sense
that the shares of overall risk attributed to individual institutions exactly sum to the
total risk, i.e the ∆MCoVaR (or ∆MCoES) of all the financial institutions in the system
being in distress.
4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we focus on the interconnectedness between banking, financial services
and insurance sectors during the period 1992–2013 with particular emphasis on the
distinction between life and non–life insurance companies. life and non–life insurers
mainly differ for their exposure to risk as well as for the composition of their respective
investment portfolios which is quite relevant for systemic risk management and it is
strictly connected with the core business of the company. Concerning the first aspect,
life insurance companies are more exposed than non–life ones to the risk related to
catastrophic mortality events. Moreover, life insurance companies usually have longer
investment horizons and this characteristic largely contributes to increase their riskiness
with respect to events which affect aggregate financial market downturns or contractions
in the aggregate income. On these basis we argue that financial crisis should impact
more the life insurance industry than the non–life one. Concerning their respective
7
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Figure 1: Cumulative returns of the different sectors: banks (blue line), financial services (red line),
life insurance (dark line) and non–life insurance (green line).
Vertical dotted lines represent major financial downturns: the “Black Wednesday” (September 16,
1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock,
the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan
Chase, (March 16, 2008), the Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent
global financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23,
2010, Greek crisis).
individual contribution to the overall risk it is of relevance, for risk policy purposes,
to assess whether they actively contribute to spread risks over different sectors or if
they instead are victims of negative contagion effects. To examine how the overall risk
shares among the US banking, insurance and the more general financial sectors, we use
the multivariate Student–t MS model and the methodology explained in the previous
sections to four sector indexes belonging to the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA)
index. The next section describes the data used in our empirical analysis while sections
4.2 and 4.3 detail our main findings.
4.1 The data
To assess the overall risk contribution of life and non-life insurances, banks and other
financial institution in the US market, we consider four sector indexes belonging to the
US Dow Jones Composite Index: banks, financial services, life and non–life insurance.
Market weekly returns of the four sector’s indexes spans the period from January
1, 1992 to June 28, 2013. Full sample descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1
in Appendix A. We observe that both insurance sectors are characterised by a more
pronounced skewness with respect to the banks and diversified financial services sectors.
Surprisingly, between the two insurance sectors, the life one displays the largest kurtosis
index, a value in line with that observed for banks and significantly different from the
one observed for non–life. In addition, the Jarque–Bera (JB) statistic confirms the
departure from normality for all return series at the 1% level of significance. Moreover,
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the 1% empirical quantile in column eight of Table 1 supports the idea that life
insurance individually considered would be the riskiest sector among those considered
in this analysis. However, since our main concern is to investigate how sources of
risk spread among different sectors, we need to gather informations about their joint
dynamic evolution. In an unreported analysis, as a first step we evaluate the full sample
correlation between sectors noting that non–life insurance is less correlated to the banks
sector than the life one and displays the largest coefficient with the diversified financial
service sector. On these grounds one should argues that the market co–movements
between banks and life insurers should be larger than intra–sectorial ones (the two
kind of insurers we consider here). In Section 4.2 we show that this evidence can be
misleading when considering extreme interdependent events. One possible explanation
for this discordant results can be ascribed to the presence of non–linear relations
among asset returns otherwise captured by assuming a Student–t distribution for the
conditional density of the MS model.
Figure 1 shows the time series of cumulative returns for all the considered assets,
from January 2nd, 1992 till the end of the sample. Vertical dotted lines refer to the
following events: the “Black Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the Asian crisis (July,
1997), the Russian crisis (August, 1998), the September 11–2001 shock, the onset of the
mortgage subprime crisis identified by the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August
5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase, (March 16, 2008), the
Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent global
financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and the European sovereign–debt crisis of April 2010
(April 23, 2010, Greek crisis). The figure gives insights about how the crisis periods
affect the different sectors here considered. After the 2001 Twin Towers attack till the
middle of 2007, the US financial system experienced a long period of small perturbations
and stability ended shortly after the collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds in early
August 2007. Starting from August 2007, the financial market experiences a huge fall,
the subprime mortgage crisis that led to a financial crisis and subsequent recession that
began in 2008. Several major financial institutions collapsed in September 2008, with
significant disruption in the flow of credit to businesses and consumers and the onset of
a severe global recession. The system hit the bottom in March 2009, and then started a
slow recovery which culminated just before the European sovereign–debt crisis of April
2010. It is interesting to note that, since the beginning of the 2007 global crisis all the
considered sectors experienced huge capital losses with the banking sector (blue line)
being the most affected by the crisis. Moreover, banks and non–life insurance, on one
hand, and financial services and life insurance, on the other hand, become more related
after European sovereign–debt crisis, displaying similar trends.
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4.2 Estimation Results
In this section we proceed by fitting the best model for the data considered and by
estimating all the parameters involved. To select the best model in the multivariate
Student–t MS setting we need to chose the number L of latent states {St, t = 1, . . . , T}.
According to the current literature (see e.g. Cappe´ et al. 2005; Ryde´n, 2008), we apply
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
which involve different penalisation terms depending on the number of non–redundant
parameters. In particular, we fit the proposed model with a number of hidden states L
from 2 to 6. The results of this preliminary analysis are reported in Table 2 in Appendix
A where it is evident that both information criteria prefer the model with four hidden
states.
For the selected model, Tables 3 and 4 in Appendix A summarise parameter
estimates. The dynamical evolution of risk–return profiles, often documented in
the financial literature, is well captured by our model. In fact, we observe in
Table 4, that two positive (state 1 and 2) and two negative (state 3 and 4)
regimes are identified according to significantly different state–specific return means.
Furthermore, large negative returns (state 1) are characterised by quite large standard
deviations (parameter Λ) as opposed to negative returns where standard deviations are
substantially lower. States 2 and 3 identify periods of low volatility associated with
moderately negative and positive mean returns respectively. This essentially implies
that state 1 and 4 can be identified as periods of financial turbulence and stability, while
state 2 and 3 are regimes where the financial system transits just after or immediately
before a crisis periods. This latter observation can be evinced also by inspecting Figure
3 displaying the Markovian smoothed probabilities of being in a given state at each time
period P (St | IT ). During the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, for example, we observe
that the probability of being in state 1 (turbulence) is larger than 99%. During the
period immediately before the 2007 crisis, covering most of the 2006 and 2007 years, till
the Bearn Stearns hedge fund collapse of August 2007, the system visits the transitory
state 2, which correspond to the pre–crisis regime. All those results document the
importance of choosing the right model specification in order to understand the global
dynamics of the economic system.
As extensively documented in Bernardi et al. (2013b), the multivariate Student–t
approach considered here, is also able to identify different contagion effects among
stocks, measured by the state–specific correlations (parameter Ω). As expected,
correlations are higher during crisis period while, during more stable phases, variances
are relatively low and the contagion effect is less marked.
Table 3 provides parameter estimates of the Student–t degrees–of–freedom ν and the
transition probabilities Q of the hidden Markov chain. Looking at the ν parameters
estimate fat–tails have been detected and this is in line with empirically observed
stylised facts. Moreover, the introduction of conditional Student–t distributions
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increases the state persistence significantly, resulting in longer and more stable volatility
periods. This is confirmed by the transition matrix estimate. The large off–diagonal
transition probabilities in all states except the first one, confirms the large persistence
of the transitory states (2 and 3) as well as the state 4 of financial stability. State 1
of financial crisis is instead characterised by a smaller probability value on the main
diagonal and by a moderately large probability to move to state 2, suggesting that after
coming out from a crisis the system enters a period of “moderate” financial turbulence.
It important to note that, although parameter estimates provide relevant
information to support the policy decision making process, they do not provide enough
insights to evaluate extreme tail interdependence.
4.3 Overall risk contributions
The goal of this section is to analyse how the overall risk spreads among different
sectors by inspecting the time evolution of the Shapley values risk measures introduced
in the previous sections. For further details on the application of the Shapley value
as a measure of risk attribution and its properties we refer the reader to the paper of
Bernardi et al. (2013b).
We examine whether the extreme–tail interdependence among banks, financial
services and insurance sectors have changed over time. The interconnectedness among
sectors, and in particular between the financial and the insurance sectors, have been
highly investigated in the recent literature. In their empirical investigation, Bernal et al.
(2013), for example, found that banks contribute relatively the most to systemic risk
in the Eurozone, while the insurance industry is the most systemically risky sector
in the US for the period 2004–2012. Recently, Chen et al. (2013) and Billio et
al. (2012), using univariate Granger–causality analyses, show a significant two–way
interconnection between banking and insurance sectors. Our model–based approach
instead is able to investigate the contribution of each sector to the risk of all the
remaining ones in a multivariate framework. Furthermore our analysis considers
different distress events jointly affecting the market participants health level. Figure
2 plots the overall risk of each sector based on Multiple–CoVaR and Multiple–CoES
at confidence level τ1 = τ2 = 0.05. The total risk in Figure 2 provides the benchmark
for regulators to calculate individual sector contributions to the overall risk when all
the remaining others are in distress. The dynamic evolution of the total risk for all
sectors suggests that, during the analysed period, there have been four major downside
peaks: the Russian crisis at the end 1998 which partially overlaps the dot–com bubble
of 1999–2000; the 11–September shock and the recent global financial crisis of 2007–
2009. Interestingly, both the Russian crisis and the recent mortgage subprime crisis of
2007, that are followed by several years of financial turbulence affecting all the sectors,
are anticipated by a long period where the total risk increased significantly. Although
both crisis episodes have been characterised different durations as well as financial and
11
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12
−0.6
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
Figure 2: Total risk evaluated by Multiple–CoVaR (Top panel) and Multiple–CoES (Bottom panel)
for the different sectors: banks (blue line), financial services (red line), life insurance (dark line) and
non–life insurance (green line).
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Figure 3: Smoothed probabilities of visiting the states of the Markovian chain P (St = j | IT ) for
j = 1, . . . , 4 (from top to bottom) implied by the Student–t model with four components.
Vertical dotted lines represent major financial downturns: the “Black Wednesday” (September 16,
1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock,
the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan
Chase, (March 16, 2008), the Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent
global financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23,
2010, Greek crisis).
economic conditions we observe that they are anticipated by an increased level of overall
risk. This evidence supports the use of the total risk measure as a leading indicator for
the financial crisis. Concerning in particular the Russian crisis, a careful inspection of
12
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Figure 4: Shalpey value based on ∆M–CoVaR of the different sectors against banks (a), financial
services (b), life insurance (c) and non–life insurance (d). Vertical dotted lines represent major financial
downturns: the “Black Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian
crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock, the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August
5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase, (March 16, 2008), the Lehman’s failure
(September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent global financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and
the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23, 2010, Greek crisis).
Figure 2 we observe that the total risk for all sectors increased suddenly in conjunction
with the antecedent Asian crisis of middle 1997. Then, the system experienced a long
period of financial instability encompassing all the three subsequent crisis culminated
with the Twin towers attack of September 2001. Concerning the recent global crisis,
instead, we observe that the total risk increases long time before the Bear Stearns hedge
found collapse of August 2007, for all sectors. In fact, looking at Figure 3 we note that
the system transits into state 2 since mid 2006 anticipating the subsequent market
turbulence. Another important difference between the two periods of financial crisis,
1997–2001 and 2007–2009, emerges by comparing the total risk evolution in Figure 2
with the smoothed probabilities in Figure 3. It is evident that the latter financial crisis
has been more persistent than those occurred in the previous decades. In fact, during
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Figure 5: Shalpey value based on ∆M–CoES of the different sectors against banks (a), financial
services (b), life insurance (c) and non–life insurance (d). Vertical dotted lines represent major financial
downturns: the “Black Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian
crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock, the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August
5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase, (March 16, 2008), the Lehman’s failure
(September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent global financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and
the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23, 2010, Greek crisis).
the period 1997–2001 the system is in state 2 of moderate instability while during the
period 2007–2009 the system is in state 1 of financial turbulence for most of the time.
Finally, we observed that the US market is not affected by European sovereign debt
crisis in May 2010.
It is interesting to note that the total risk dynamics in Figure 2 suggests that,
before the 2007, the financial services sector (red line) is the most affected by the other
sectors’ distress, while the banking and the insurance sectors display a similar low level
of risk, whereupon this ordering completely change by the beginning of the 2009, with
banks (blue line) and life insurance (dark line) being the most risky sectors. In fact, we
observe that the total risk contributions change during crisis periods becoming larger
in levels and reversing the ordering of importance.
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Figure 6: Vis–a`–vis comparisons of Shapleys value based on ∆MCoVaR for the different sectors.
Vertical dotted lines represent major financial downturns: the “Black Wednesday” (September 16,
1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock,
the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan
Chase, (March 16, 2008), the Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent
global financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23,
2010, Greek crisis).
As said before the total risk contribution analysis identifies the sector most affected
by the crisis of all the remaining ones during different periods of time providing an
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Figure 7: Vis–a`–vis comparisons of Shapleys value based on ∆MCoES for the different sectors. Vertical
dotted lines represent major financial downturns: the “Black Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the
Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001 shock, the Bear
Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase,
(March 16, 2008), the Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent global
financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23, 2010,
Greek crisis).
important tool for risk management. This analysis by itself is not conclusive because it
considers all the other institutions or sectors except one at their distress level. This is
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the reason why, once we get the ∆MCoVaR and ∆MCoES risk measures for each sector
given all the possible combinations of the remaining sectors distress’ events, we apply
the Shapley value methodology to compose the puzzle of their synthesis to provide
a unifying measure. The resulting Shapley values act as an overall risk distributor
among the market participants providing the marginal contributions to each of the
considered sectors of the remaining sectors’ distress. In our case, since we are measuring
interconnections among four sectors, we have three Shapley value contributions for
each of them. Figure 4 and 5 plot the individual marginal contributions calculated by
means of the Shapley value ShVi based on ∆
MCoVaRi|Jd and ∆
MCoESi|Jd , respectively.
Figure (4a) plots the Shapley Values contributions of financial services, life insurance
and non–life insurance on the banking sector. We observe that the financial services
(light gray line) sector contributes more to the distress of the banking sector than both
the life and non–life insurance sectors, independently on the overall financial situation
identified by the hidden state. Furthermore, during periods of financial stability, the
contribution of financial services is about two times larger than that of life and non–
life insurance. During periods of crisis, instead, the contributions of financial services
and non–life insurance decrease, while that of life insurance increases, so that the
contribution of non–life insurance becomes negligible and those of financial services
and life insurance approach almost the same level. Figure (4b) plots the contributions
on the financial services sector. The picture is similar to the one in Figure (4a) with the
role of banks and financial services and that of life and non–life insurance reversed. This
essentially means that banks and financial services are strongly interconnected. Figure
(4c) and (4d) plot the contributions on life and non–life insurance sectors, respectively.
Comparing the two figures we observe that these sectors are highly interconnected
during period of crisis as well as during period of financial stability. In Figure (4c)
the contributions of banks and financial services on life insurance looks the same and
they increase suddenly after the recent global financial crisis ends. In Figure (4d)
the contribution of banks on non–life insurance is low compared to other sectors’
contributions, suggesting that the banking sector is more interconnected with the life
insurance (see Figure 4c) than with the non–life one. The results here presented are
confirmed by inspecting Figure 5 where individual marginal contributions are calculated
by means of the Shapley value ShVi based on ∆
MCoESi|Jd .
To deeply understand the relative impact of each sector’s financial distress on all
the other sectors, we plot the two way comparisons of marginal contributions for all
the possible pairs of sectors. Figures 6 and 7 plot the vis–a`–vis comparisons based on
the Shapley value ∆MCoVaR and ∆MCoES, respectively. Figures 6a and 7a consider
the banking and diversified financial services sectors. Independently of the hidden
state, it is clear that the financial services’ distress impacts more the banking sector
than the other way around. Figures 6b and 7b consider the banking sector against
the life insurance one. This picture highlights an important aspect of the extreme
interconnection between these sectors that can be captured by the dynamic Shapley
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approach here proposed. In particular, it is evident that, prior to the recent global
financial crisis of 2007–2009, banks impact more the life insurance during periods of
financial stability (for example 2002–2006), than the vice–versa, while, after the end
of 2008, we observe the order of importance between these two sectors reverses. This
behaviour is peculiar of the banking and life insurance sectors, and does not characterise
the relationship between the banking sector on non–life insurance depicted in Figures
6c and 7c. These two latter sectors seem to be highly interconnected with a slight
predominance of the banks. Figures 6c and 7c consider the impact of the financial
sector on life and non–life insurance sectors, providing clear evidence that the financial
sector highly impacts the insurance sector. Moreover, the ∆MCoVaR and ∆MCoES
Shapley values seem to be slightly different. In fact, if we look at the ∆MCoVaR–
Shapley value in Figure 6d it seems that, during periods of financial instability, life
insurance provides a larger contribution than financial services. Finally, Figures 6f and
7f consider the interconnection between the insurance sectors, providing clear evidence
that these two sectors are highly interconnected till the end of 2008. After the end of
2008 relative weight of life insurance decreased.
In Table 5, we provide the comparison between the estimated Shapley–∆MCoES
series and the Standard ∆CoES series for each of the considered sectors against each
other. For each pair of sectors, the standard ∆CoES of Adrian and Brunnermeier
(2011) is calculated appropriately modifying equation (3.4) on the bivariate Student–t
MS output. Is is evident that, as expected, except for the banks and life insurance pairs,
the signal provided by the standard ∆CoES differs significantly from that provided by
our risk measure based on the Shapley value. Ad discussed by Bernardi et al. (2013b)
the two risk measures coincide only under the conditional independence assumption for
the Student–t case.
5 Discussion
The model–based approach to the overall risk assessment developed in Bernardi et al.
(2013b) and applied here to four sector belonging to the US Dow Jones Composite
Index allows to understand how the risk spread among the banking, life and non–life
insurance and other financial services sectors. Our empirical findings suggest that
each financial sector significantly impacts each other during crisis periods, as well
as during more stable phases. When comparing the contribution of each financial
industry, banks appear to be the major source of risk for all the remaining ones,
followed by the financial services and the insurance sectors. This results are in line
with previous findings (see e.g. Bernal et al., 2013) and are supported by theoretical
arguments. Adams et al. (2011) and Girardi and Ergu¨n (2013), for example, found
that the banking sector is systemically riskier than the insurance sector. Banks are
particularly fragile institutions because of their core business – especially credit activity
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to households and corporate companies along with short–term funding – making the
banking sector particularly exposed to the overall risk. insurance companies, instead,
generally fund themselves through long–term premiums and have higher disposable–
liquidity. This latter argument plays an important role since financial crises usually
begin with a liquidity squeeze that further weakens the capital position of vulnerable
firms. Another argument is that balance sheets of banks are highly volatile and exposed
to economic cycles while insurance companies usually present simple and economically
stable balance sheets due to their long–term oriented business.
Another aspect of relevant interest is the degree of financial interconnection among
different financial sectors with particular emphasis to the banking and insurance ones.
Our Shapley value ∆MCoVaR and ∆MCoES risk measures are able to identify sector
interconnections as well as the directions through which the spillover mechanism takes
place. Recently, the financial literature has pointed out the fact that banks are also
much more interconnected than insurance companies through interbank lending such
as the repo market. Eventually, the size of the banking sector much greater than the
one of the insurance sector can also be a factor explaining that banks appear as the
most risky in our study.
Finally, our results regarding the systemic role of the four financial sectors in the
United States are consistent with recent argument raised in the literature emphasising
the risk associated to fast growing non–core activities (such as credit derivatives) of
insurance companies (Bell and Keller, 2009; Cummins and Weiss, 2012). In fact, he
non-core activities of U.S. insurance firms highly increased over the last decade.
6 Conclusion
This paper aims to assess the contribution of the different sectors of the financial system
to the overall risk and to measure their degree of interconnectedness. To that end, we
split the financial system into four sectors corresponding respectively to the banking, life
and non–life insurance and other financial services industries. The impact of distress
within any one of these sectors is measured using the Shapley value ∆MCoVaR (or
∆MCoES) risk measure proposed by Bernardi et al. (2013b). More precisely, the
Shapley value ∆MCoVaR (∆MCoES) extends the traditional ∆CoVaR approach of
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) to the case where multiple distress events are jointly
observed as it is often the case during period of financial instability. The Shapley
value ∆MCoVaR and ∆MCoES can therefore be interpreted as the additional level of
risk faced by each sector arising from the distress of one or more of the remaining
financial sectors of interest. Empirical results reveal that in the US financial market,
for the period ranging from 1992 to 2012, the banking sector contributes relatively
the most to the risk of all other sectors during periods of distress affecting this sector.
By contrast, the life insurance industry is the less risky financial sector in the United
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States for the same period of time. Furthermore, the life insurance industry appears
to be highly interconnected with the non–life one, while diversified financial services
seems to be highly interconnected with the banking system. This essentially means
that during period of financial instability large losses in the banking sector affect the
financial services sector more than the insurance sector.
Acknowledgments This work has been partially supported by the 2011 Sapienza
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A Tables
Name Min Max Mean×103 Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 1% Str. Lev. JB
Banks -0.318 0.377 0.930 0.042 -0.050 19.786 -0.106 13325.840
Fin. srvs -0.243 0.242 1.588 0.037 -0.008 8.326 -0.096 1341.471
Life insur. -0.379 0.336 1.566 0.043 -0.657 24.121 -0.124 21178.483
Non–life Insur. -0.272 0.157 1.076 0.030 -0.661 12.363 -0.085 4228.914
Table 1: Summary statistics of the US sector indexes form January, 2nd 1992 till June, 28th
2013. The eight column, denoted by “1% Str. Lev.” is the 1% empirical quantile of the
returns distribution, while the last column, denoted by “JB” is the value of the Jarque-Bera´
test-statistics.
L log-likelihood AIC BIC
2 11889.544 -23713.088 -23410.697
3 11713.089 -23320.177 -23053.355
4 11969.138 -23788.276 -23546.954
5 11946.912 -23695.824 -23197.420
6 11973.013 -23696.025 -23066.727
Table 2: Log-likelihood, AIC and BIC values for Student-t Markov Switching models with
different components. Bold faces indicates the selected model.
ν
State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
15.6839 10.2542 11.0300 9.9473
Q State 1 State 2 State 3 State 4
State 1 0.8934 0.1066 0.0000 0.0000
State 2 0.0244 0.9608 0.0071 0.0077
State 3 0.0000 0.0000 0.9919 0.0081
State 4 0.0000 0.0052 0.0022 0.9926
Table 3: ML estimates of the initial probability δ and transition probability matrix Q of the
Markov chain for the selected Student–t Markov Switching model with four components.
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µ× 103 Banks Fin. srvs Life insur. Non–life insur.
State 1 -6.8905 -0.2288 -8.1268 -2.7188
State 2 -4.5542 -4.2744 -1.9875 -3.4971
State 3 1.0459 1.8574 1.2758 1.9089
State 4 3.5818 4.4010 4.3724 2.9295
Λ× 103 Banks Fin. srvs Life insur. Non–life insur.
State 1 13.8891 7.0203 15.6855 4.3998
State 1 1.4302 1.6766 1.0333 1.0232
State 1 0.9998 0.6871 1.2204 0.3585
State 1 0.3427 0.5197 0.2827 0.3137
Ω1 Banks Fin. srvs Life insur. Non–life insur.
Banks 1.0000
Fin. srvs 0.8399 1.0000
Life insur. 0.8511 0.8248 1.0000
Non–life insur. 0.6966 0.8013 0.8015 1.0000
Ω2 Banks Fin. srvs Life insur. Non–life insur.
Banks 1.0000
Fin. srvs 0.8573 1.0000
Life insur. 0.7654 0.7771 1.0000
Non–life insur. 0.7683 0.7881 0.8205 1.0000
Ω3 Banks Fin. srvs Life insur. Non–life insur.
Banks 1.0000
Fin. srvs 0.8807 1.0000
Life insur. 0.8537 0.8939 1.0000
Non–life insur. 0.7827 0.8472 0.8555 1.0000
Ω4 Banks Fin. srvs Life insur. Non–life insur.
Banks 1.0000
Fin. srvs 0.8620 1.0000
Life insur. 0.7337 0.7678 1.0000
Non–life insur. 0.7250 0.7622 0.7792 1.0000
Table 4: ML parameter estimates of the selected Student–t Markov Switching model with
four components where µ are locations while the diagonal matrix Λ and the full matrix Ω are
such that Σ = ΛΩΛ.
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banks fin. srvs life Ins. non–life Ins.
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Table 5: Comparison of the Shapley value ∆MCoES (light gray) and the Adrian and Brunnermeier’s standard ∆MCoVaR
approach (light gray) for all the sector against each other. Vertical dotted lines represent major financial downturns: the “Black
Wednesday” (September 16, 1992), the Asian crisis (July, 1997), the Russian crisis (August, 1998), the September 11, 2001
shock, the Bear Stearns hedge funds collapse (August 5, 2007), the Bear Stearns acquisition by JP Morgan Chase, (March 16,
2008), the Lehman’s failure (September 15, 2008), the peak of the onset of the recent global financial crisis (March 9, 2009) and
the European sovereign-debt crisis of April 2010 (April 23, 2010, Greek crisis).
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